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Abstract
This paper shows for the first time that distributed computing can be both reliable and efficient in
an environment that is both highly dynamic and hostile. More specifically, we show how to maintain
clusters of size O(logN), each containing more than two thirds of honest nodes with high probability,
within a system whose size can vary polynomially with respect to its initial size. Furthermore, the
communication cost induced by each node arrival or departure is polylogarithmic with respect to N ,
the maximal size of the system. Our clustering can be achieved despite the presence of a Byzantine
adversary controlling a fraction τ ≤ 13 −  of the nodes, for some fixed constant  > 0, independent of
N . So far, such a clustering could only be performed for systems who size can vary constantly and
it was not clear whether that was at all possible for polynomial variances.
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1 Introduction
Distributed computing can be achieved reliably in a system where at most one third of the processes are
controlled by an adversary. Typically, assuming some synchrony, the seminal agreement problem [32]
can be solved and used to emulate a single highly available process. This is a basic building block to
achieve distributed computations in a reliable manner. Yet, with a large number of nodes, this technique
is very expensive. One way to reduce the complexity consists in clustering the nodes within smaller
subsets, picked randomly, so that each cluster contains two third of correct nodes whp, e.g., as proposed
in [15]. In short, instead of reducing a system of many processes into a system of one reliable process
that performs the computation, the idea here is to reduce it to a system of several reliable processes,
each corresponding to one of the clusters. These processes share the load of the computations reducing
thereby their complexity.
So far, clustering techniques mainly assumed a static distributed system: the number n of processes
is assumed to be fixed a priori and processes do not join or leave the system [20] (a few can typically fail).
Some approaches have explored dynamic settings, but in a limited fashion: the number of processes n
is assumed to only vary by a constant factor [7, 8, 16, 41]. Yet, whether this is at all possible to go
beyond has been considered an open question so far [25, 26].
This paper answers the question positively. We show, for the first time, that it is possible to perform
distributed computing reliably and efficiently in a system which size can vary in a polynomial manner.
At the heart of this result lies a new technique to partition nodes in a dynamic number of clusters, which
involves a radical departure from previous schemes that assume a static number of clusters [7, 8, 16, 41].
Indeed, tolerating an increase in the number of nodes from n to n2 (and more generally from n1/y to
nz for some constants y, z > 1), with a static number of clusters, yields a significant increase in the
number of nodes within each cluster, leading to a high-complexity computation, in the vein of a single
cluster approach. However, handling dynamic clusters is not trivial. For instance, using classical De
Brujin graphs for clustering [7] in a dynamic setting requires a good estimation of the number of nodes.
In turn, this potentially requires techniques with high complexity, e.g., typically O˜(n3/2) [31].
Our clustering approach achieves a polylogarithmic complexity by using random walks on expander
graphs with small degrees. To ensure that each cluster contains two thirds of correct nodes with high
probability, we exchange nodes between clusters whenever new nodes join or leave the system. The nodes
that are candidate to the exchange are selected using continuous random walks [1]. These provide a
uniformly chosen sample even if the underlying graph is not regular. To ensure that a walk ends up
fast on a node picked quasi uniformly, we connect clusters through small degree expanders [27].
The distributed construction of this expander requires specific care in regulating the choice of edges.
Although several expanders could be used, our approach relies on OVER, a technique (Over-Valued
Erdo¨s Re`iny graph) from Erdo¨s Re`iny random graphs to preserve a small degree and a good expansion
coefficient. OVER is described in the Appendix for space reasons. This technique tolerates more
crashes than [3, 21, 33] and yields a different degree than [2]. In the rest of the paper, we present
NOW (Neighbors On Watch), a protocol maintaining the cluster partition in Section 3 and analyze it
in Section 4. We review the related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. Some background
about continuous time random walk as well as more details about possible applications of our clustering
technique are also provided in the appendix.
2 Model and background
System assumptions. In short, our network model is the one of [8] with the difference that we
allow the size of the system to vary polynomially. More specifically, we consider a dynamic synchronous
network with a discrete time variable ti. Each node can send messages to any node it knows through a
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private channel; in this sense the network is reconfigurable as connections between nodes can be added
or removed. We do not assume that each node knows all other nodes in the network (except during the
initialization phase in which the global structure of the network is computed once). Instead, each node
knows polylog(N) nodes and only knows an upper bound on the current size of the network. We also
assume that, initially, the number of nodes is nt0 for some
√
N ≤ nt0 ≤ N , and the current number
of nodes n in the network remains between
√
N and N (this can be relaxed to N1/y ≤ n ≤ N z for all
constants y, z > 1). The size of the network can increase or decrease at any time. For simplicity of
presentation, we assume (as in [8, 33]) that when a node joins or leaves, the actions relative to previous
joins and leaves are over. This corresponds to a time step.∗ Moreover, nodes do not need to take any
specific action when leaving the network. Instead, we assume a mechanism enabling a node to detect if
one of its neighbors has crashed or left the network.
Adversary model. Our adversary is that of [8] with the difference that in our case it controls a
fraction τ ≤ 13 −  (for some constant  > 0) nodes, from the beginning (vs. τ ≤ 12 −  after some
initialization phase; note that using cryptographic tools, we could also assume τ ≤ 12 −  by leveraging
broadcast algorithms [19].).
NOW tolerates a static Byzantine (sometimes called active) adversary controlling a fraction τ ≤ 13−
(for some constant  > 0) of the nodes, having a full knowledge of the network at any time, as in [8, 25],
i.e it knows the position of any node at any time. A typical objective for the adversary is to gain the
lead in one (or more) of the clusters. At the beginning of the protocol, the adversary can choose a
fraction τ of the nodes to corrupt. We assume that, at initialization, the honest nodes form a connected
component, that the adversary cannot split it into disjoint parts, that each node controlled by the
adversary is adjacent to at least one honest node, and that no honest node leaves or joins the network
until the initialization is over. Also, nodes’ identities cannot be forged. Moreover during the execution
of the protocol, each time a node joins the network, the adversary can choose to corrupt it or not,
as in [7, 8]. However, the adversary cannot decide to corrupt nodes at a later time (in this sense the
adversary is static and not adaptive). Furthermore, the adversary can induce churn as in [7, 8] by
join-leave attacks or by forcing honest nodes to leave the system (e.g., through a DOS attack). The size
of the network can vary polynomially and each node is assigned a unique identifier.
Background on OVER: expander graph. Our clustering technique, which we call NOW (Neigh-
bors On Watch) and that maintains a cluster partition is based on a protocol to distributely maintain
an expander overlay. Although various expanders (e.g. [2]) could be used, we assume that NOW relies
on OVER. For space reasons, the detailed description of OVER is deferred to the appendix (Section B).
In OVER, the graph vertices represent the clusters of nodes maintained by NOW, hence they can be
considered as honest since each vertex is composed of more than two thirds of honest nodes whp. We
further assume that each vertex leaving the overlay graph is chosen at random (this assumption will be
ensured in Section 3.3).
OVER ensures that, starting from a random graph drawn from the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, whp, at any
time during a sequence of vertex additions and removals polynomial in N , the resulting graph has a
large isoperimetric constant and a low degree (ensuring properties 1 and 2). We use the notation ĜR
where the ˆ relates to the fact that we consider an overlay, and the R that it is an instance of a random
graph. The evolution of the graph is represented by a sequence ĜRt0 , . . . , Ĝ
R
ti , . . .. nti denotes the number
of vertices of ĜRti .
Property 1. Whp, at any time t after a number of time steps polynomial in n, ĜRt = (Vˆ
R
t , Eˆ
R
t ) has
an isoperimetric constant I(ĜRt ) ≥ log1+αN/2, where:
∗However, the analysis can be generalized to several parallel join and leave operations.
3
I(ĜRt ) = infS⊂Vˆ Rt :|S|≤nt/2E(S, S¯)/|S|.
Property 2 (Maximum degree of ĜR). Whp, at any time t after a number of time steps polynomial
in n, ĜRt has maximal degree at most c log
1+αN for a large enough constant c and an arbitrarily small
(pre-)chosen constant α.
Those properties enable to achieve short random walks leading to pick nodes uniformly at random.
Note that OVER enables to tolerate simultaneous failures as long as the targets are picked uniformly
at random. NOW together with OVER can also tolerate the failures of nodes chosen by the adversary
as long as one failure per round is assumed.
Notations. We use the time step as a subscript to indicate the instant at which a variable is considered
(e.g., nti is the number of nodes at time ti, #Cti is the number of clusters, and |Cj |ti the size of Cj). We
may omit the index of the time step when there is no ambiguity (e.g., n stands for the current number of
nodes in the network). The communication cost is the number of messages† exchanged, and the round
complexity, is the number of communication rounds (i.e. the number of successive messages) required
by a protocol to terminate. Notice that a time step is composed of several communication rounds, but
we will prove that they are polylog(N). Given a graph G = (V,E), and a vertex v ∈ G, we denote by
dv its degree. Similarly, for a given cluster C, dC denotes the number of clusters adjacent to C.
3 NOW: Overlay of clusters
NOW (Neighbors On Watch) maintains both an overlay of clusters and the partition of the nodes into
clusters. NOW relies on the fact that the overlay is guaranteed to have a low maximum degree and
good expansion properties. This is provided by the protocol OVER that we present in the appendix but
could also be ensured by other protocols which differ either in the number of failures they can provide
[3, 21, 33] or their degree (e.g., 4 in [2] instead of log1+αN in OVER for some arbitrarily small constant
α > 0) ). NOW further ensures that each cluster contains more than two thirds of honest nodes whp.
The clusters have size O(logN) and are used to inhibit the behavior of the Byzantine nodes. NOW
relies on two phases: initialization and maintenance. In a nutshell, the initialization phase generates
the initial overlay, while the maintenance phase ensures that after a polynomially long sequence of leave
and join operations, the required properties still hold. The overlay ĜR is first constructed during the
initialization phase of NOW, and recursively maintained by OVER as described in Appendix, Section B.
3.1 Preliminaries.
A node of a cluster C is linked to all the other nodes of C and knows their identities. An edge between
two clusters Ci and Cj in Ĝ
R means that all nodes of Ci are linked to all nodes of Cj and know
their identities (and vice-versa). A node only needs to know the identities of the nodes in its cluster
and the neighboring ones. The initialization phase (Section 3.2) is itself divided into two sub-phases.
First, a discovery algorithm is run in order for the nodes to acquire a global knowledge of the network.
Afterwards, a Byzantine agreement algorithm [26] is used to construct an initial overlay of clusters. The
maintenance phase ensures that each cluster contains more than two thirds of honest nodes whp when
nodes join or leave and preserves the properties of the overlay.
†We consider messages of identical size. Hence the communication cost is proportional to the number of bits sent.
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join and leave operations
Up to a polynomial number of
Compute global knowledge
complexity: O(N3/2 logN)
Small graph (n =
√
N) Local knowledge and
√
N ≤ n ≤ N
Preserve a good partition of the nodes
Maintenance
Maintain the overlay
complexity: Polylog(N)
Initialization
Apply robust Byzantine Agreement
Figure 1: Overview of NOW.
Random number generation. We assume the existence of randNum, a distributed random number
generation protocol, enabling the nodes of a cluster to agree on a common integer chosen uniformly at
random from the interval (0, r). randNum is secure as long as the Byzantine nodes are less than two
thirds in the cluster and is presented in the appendix (Section C.1).
Cluster random choice. Furthermore, we assume the existence of a function called randCl (Al-
gorithm 8 in Appendix), to randomly select a cluster. To achieve the random selection (randCl), we
perform a biased CTRW ‡ on ĜR, the overlay. We bias our CTRW such that a cluster is chosen ac-
cording to the distribution (|Ci|/n). With clusters of size O(logN), this primitive has an expected
communication cost of O(log5N). Indeed, the expected number of clusters visited during the walk is
O(log3N) (whp, we do O(log n) CTRW each of length O(log2 n)) and at each cluster a random integer
from the range (0, O(log1+αN)) is generated at a cost of O(log2N). The expected round complexity of
this primitive is O(log4N).
Node shuffling. In order to avoid an adversary to focus on one cluster and gradually pollute it with
Byzantine nodes, shuffling nodes between clusters is necessary upon nodes arrival and departure. The
shuffling is implemented by the algorithm called exchange and detailed in Appendix (Algorithm 9).
Basically some clusters exchange their nodes with nodes chosen at random from other clusters. For
each node x to be exchanged from cluster C (x is determined by the protocol exchange), a cluster is
chosen at random using randCl. The chosen cluster, C ′, is informed that it will receive x. The cluster C ′
chooses one of its nodes (using the primitive randNum) to send in replacement of x. During an exchange,
if C is adjacent to another cluster, the nodes of this cluster are informed of the new composition of C.
This step is fundamental since a node from a neighboring cluster accepts a message from C if and only
if at least half plus one of the nodes of C send it. The new nodes of C are informed by the former nodes
of this cluster of the local structure of the overlay (i.e., the neighboring clusters of C in the overlay).
The expected communication cost and round complexity of exchange are O(log6N) and O(log4N).
3.2 NOW: Initialization Phase
Network Discovery. The protocol starts by running an algorithm that informs each node of the
identifiers of all other nodes. The global knowledge of the nodes in the network is needed only at
initialization. Note that this computation is performed while the size of the network is still “small”
in practice. Afterwards, it is possible to use standard off-the-shelf Byzantine agreement algorithms to
construct an initial partition forming the vertices of the overlay ĜR. This algorithm (Algorithm 10
‡A vertex Ci of ĜR is a cluster in G. A biased CTRW from Ci is a sequence of CTRW as follows: the nodes of Ci choose
collaboratively the next cluster Cj and decrease the duration of the CTRW using randNum which goes on similarly. When
the remaining duration is negative or null, a random number between 0 and 1 is chosen. If it is smaller than |Ci|/maxC |C|,
the biased CTRW ends, otherwise a CTRW starts again. A node of a cluster Cj pursues the random walk if and only if
it receives an identical message from at least half plus one of the nodes of the neighboring cluster from which the CTRW
comes.
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Join x contacts C
→ randCl outputs C ′.
→ C ′ exchanges its nodes using exchange
Merge
→ randCl outputs C.
→ C and C ′ exchange their nodes.
x leaves CLeave
→ C exchanges its nodes using exchange
with nodes from C1, . . . , C|C|.
→ C ′ is removed and its nodes re-join
→ 2 log2N edges are added using randCl
→ C1, . . . , C|C| exchange their nodes using exchange.
→ neighbors chosen for C2 using randNum and randCl.
Split
→ C is partitioned in C1 and C2if |C ′| > lk logN
if |C| < k logN/l
Figure 2: Maintenance of the overlay. Each operation has a polylog(N) complexity.
provided in Appendix) terminates after a number of communication rounds at most the diameter of the
graph considering only the edges adjacent to at least one honest node. When the algorithm terminates,
it is guaranteed that all honest nodes know the identities of all nodes in the network. Its communication
cost is O(n× e) where e = |E| (see Appendix for the theorem and details).
Clusterization. Once all the honest nodes know the identities of all the nodes in the network, any
Byzantine agreement protocol can be used, such as [26] whose complexity is O˜(n
√
n). This protocol
works in the presence of a static Byzantine adversary controlling less than 1/3 −  of the nodes for
some positive constant . A representative cluster of logarithmic size containing more than two thirds
of honest nodes is selected. Afterwards, we use the nodes of this representative cluster to randomly
partition the network into #C clusters, {C1, . . . , C#C}, each of size k logN , for some constant k. The
constant k is a security parameter of the protocol that is chosen a priori depending on the requirements
of the application considered: the higher k, the less chances the adversary has to control more than a
third of the nodes of one of the clusters. Choosing the partition at random ensures that whp, there is
more than two thirds of honest nodes in each cluster. This can be proved using standard Chernoff bound
and union bound arguments. To obtain a random partition, it is sufficient for the representative cluster
to order the nodes at random by calling the primitive randNum. Once the random ordering has been
computed, the partition is obtained by taking for each cluster k logN successive nodes. Afterwards,
ĜRt0 is initiated on top of this partition: for each pair of clusters, the representative cluster determines
with probability p = log1+αN/
√
N whether or not they will be linked by an edge in ĜRt0 . Finally, the
representative cluster tells each node x the cluster it belongs to, the identities of the other nodes in this
cluster, and the adjacent clusters as well as their composition (i.e., the identities of the nodes). The
node x is “linked” to all these nodes and can for efficiency purposes forget the identifier of any other
node that it may know. It is fundamental for the security of our protocol that each cluster contains more
than two thirds of honest nodes. Indeed, a node receiving a message from all the nodes of a particular
cluster considers this message valid if and only if, it receives the same message from more than half of
the nodes of this cluster. Using this rule for inter-cluster communication, together with the condition
that each cluster has more than two thirds of honest nodes, is sufficient to ensure the correctness of the
protocol.
3.3 NOW: Maintenance Phase
While the initialization phase of NOW ensures the desired properties for both the overlay and the
clusters, maintaining these properties under high dynamics is challenging. In this section, we describe
how to preserve the property that each cluster is composed of an honest majority in the presence of
nodes join and leave operations. Shuffling the network is crucial at this point as mentioned in [7, 8, 41]
to avoid the adversary to control a majority of nodes in a cluster after a few steps by using a very
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simple strategy: the adversary chooses a specific cluster and keeps adding and removing the Byzantine
nodes until they fall into that cluster. Similarly, it is crucial to introduce dynamics with shuffling if
nodes are forced to leave the network by the adversary. The shuffling is generated upon Join and
Leave operations. Complementary, the Split and Merge operations ensure that the clusters remain of
size Ω(logN), and that the required properties of ĜR (i.e., expansion and low maximum degree) are
preserved.
The NOW following operations are invoked by the nodes upon joining, or leaving the network, or
simultaneously by all the nodes of a cluster involved in a split or a merge operation.
Join. This operation (as well as the leave operation), initiated by a node joining the network, is
inspired by [7, 8, 41]. When a node x joins the network, we assume that it gets in contact with a
cluster of the overlay. This cluster chooses another cluster using randCl in which x is inserted. The
chosen cluster proceeds by inserting x and uses exchange for all of its nodes. This operation has a
communication cost of polylog(N).
Algorithm 1 Join operation.
Require: Node x contacting cluster C to join the network.
Ensure: The preservation of the properties of the overlay and of the clusters.
Nodes of C choose a cluster C′ using randCl.
All nodes of C′ add x to their local view of C′.
All nodes of C′ send a message to all the nodes from the neighboring clusters informing that x is added to C′.
All nodes of C′ send their neighborhood to x using the path used to find C′ in randCl.
if |C′| > kl logn then
Nodes of C′ compute a partition of C′ into two parts of roughly the same size using randCl: C1 and C2.
Nodes of C1 keep their neighborhood.
Nodes of C1 and C2 send a message informing that C
′ is replaced by C1 to the neighbors of C1.
Nodes of C2 are given a new neighborhood using Add(C2) (Algorithm 5 of OVER).
end if
Split. This operation is initiated simultaneously by all nodes of a cluster C if after a join operation,
the size of this cluster is larger than lk logN for some fixed parameter l (l is a constant greater than√
2 which influences the number of split and merge operations). Then C has to be split in two, the old
and the new clusters. To this end, the nodes of C generate a random partition of C. The old cluster
keeps its neighbors in ĜR, whereas the new cluster is added to the overlay using Add as described in
Section B. This procedure has a communication cost of polylog(N) and a O(log4N) round complexity.
Recall that each node knows the exact composition of its cluster, therefore a split operation can be
easily achieved.
Leave. This operation occurs when a node from a cluster C leaves the network or when the other
nodes of C detect its absence. C exchanges all its nodes using the primitive exchange. Then, a
cluster receiving one or more nodes from C execute exchange for all of its nodes. This process has a
communication cost of polylog(N) and a O(log4N) round complexity.
Merge. This operation is initiated simultaneously by all nodes of a cluster C containing less than
k logN
l users (for the same fixed parameter l described previously). In this situation, a cluster, chosen at
random in order to ensure Properties 1 and 2, has to be removed. This is achieved using the primitive
randCl. Nodes in C proceed as if they were joining the network while the nodes from the chosen cluster
C ′ become members of C. In ĜR, C ′ is removed by using the operation Remove described in Section B.
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Algorithm 2 Leave operation.
Require: Node x from a cluster C leaving the network.
Ensure: The preservation of the properties of the overlay and the clusters.
Nodes of C remove x from their view.
Nodes of C send a message to their neighbors informing them to remove x from their view.
A node that is a neighbor of C receiving a message to remove x ∈ C from more than half of the nodes of C removes it
from its view.
C exchanges its nodes using exchange.
A cluster exchanging one or more of its nodes with C execute the exchange procedure.
if |C′| < k logn/l then
Nodes of C inform all their neighbors that C is removed.
Nodes of C execute Remove(C1) (Algorithm 6) of OVER.
A node that is a neighbor of C receiving a message that C is removed from more than half of the nodes of C removes
it from its view.
Nodes of C execute Algorithm 1 as to rejoin the network.
end if
4 NOW: Analysis
In this section, we prove that after a polynomial sequence of join and leave operations (some of them
inducing some splitting and merging of clusters), each cluster contains more than two thirds of honest
nodes as long as the fraction of Byzantine nodes τ controlled by the adversary is smaller than 1/3− 
(for some constant  > 0 independent of n).
The results are proved under the assumption that the random choices of nodes are perfectly uniform
(i.e, the small bias induced by the random walk is ignored). This assumption is justifed by the fact
that we consider a mixing time after which the distance from the desired distribution is O(n−c) for
some arbitrarily large constant c. More specifically, we describe the output of a CTRW using two
random variables X and Y . X indicates whether or not the output of the CTRW has the desired
distribution and is defined as follows: we consider the probability distribution D of the endpoints of
a CTRW, and set pv as the probability node v is hit. Set pmin = minv(pv). The binary random
variable X has value 1 with probability n×pmin and 0 otherwise. Y is equal to node v with probability
(pv−pmin)/(
∑
w(pw−pmin)). We can reproduce D by first evaluating X. Then, if X = 1, the endpoint
is picked according to the desired distribution. Else, the endpoint is picked according to Y . We have
P (X = 0) ≤ n × max(pv − pmin) = O(n−c+1), which means that the probability of the endpoint not
to be picked as desired is O(n−c+1). Conditional to that, in the following we assume that the random
choices made using a CTRW are as desired, i.e (|C|/n) for each cluster C where |C| is its size.
4.1 Status of a cluster after exchange
At each time step, we assume that either a join or leave operation takes place or nothing occurs. These
operations may in turn induce the splitting or merging of clusters. A split operation is done directly
at the time it occurs, whereas, when a cluster executes a merge operation, we consider that its nodes
re-join the network in subsequent time steps inducing normal join operations. Given a cluster C, pCt is
the proportion of Byzantine nodes in C at time t.
Lemma 1 (2/3 of honest nodes in a cluster). If a cluster C has exchanged all its nodes at time step
t, we have P (pCt > τ(1 + )) ≤ n−γ, for any positive constant γ, as long as the security parameter k is
large enough.
Proof. When a cluster C exchanges one of its nodes with another cluster, this cluster is first selected at
random according to the probability distribution (|C|ti/n), and then a node is chosen out of it uniformly
at random. In this scenario, the probability of performing an exchange with a Byzantine node is τ .
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Using standard Chernoff bound arguments, we can derive the following result on the number X
of Byzantine nodes among |C|ti nodes: P (X > (1 + )τ |C|ti) ≤ e−
2τ |C|ti/3. Therefore as |C|ti ≥
(k logN)/l, we have P (X > (1 + )τ |C|ti) ≤ N−γ when k is sufficiently large for some constant γ.
This lemma is a consequence of the Chernoff bound arguments [22] and implies that to obtain more
than two thirds of honest nodes in a cluster whp, it is sufficient that τ +  < 1/3, which is true by
assumption on τ .
Remark 1 (Increasing the robustness). One can tolerate a fraction of Byzantine nodes up to 1/2− ,
but then we need to use cryptographic tools to allow for broadcast and Byzantine agreement.
4.2 Evolution of the divergence
To summarize, we have seen that each time a cluster exchanges all of its nodes, as long as τ(1+) < 1/3,
we obtain more than two thirds of honest nodes whp in the resulting cluster. We now proceed by proving
that in between two exchanges, this property also holds. To realize this, we focus on a specific cluster
C and consider a sequence of s join and leave operations.
We first prove that if the cluster has less than a τ(1 + /2) fraction of Byzantine nodes, then after it
has exchanged O(logN) of its nodes, it does not have more than a τ(1 + ) fraction of Byzantine nodes.
Then, we prove that if it has between a τ(1 + /2) and τ(1 + ) fraction of Byzantine nodes, then after
it has exchanged O(logN) of its nodes, it has less than a τ(1 + /2) fraction of Byzantine nodes whp.
Lemma 2. If a cluster C has less than τ(1 + /2)|C| Byzantine nodes, then after O(logN) node
exchanges with nodes chosen uniformly at random, the cluster does not contain more than τ(1 + )|C|
Byzantine nodes whp.
Proof. A cluster C with a fraction p of Byzantine nodes has a probability at most p(1 − τ) to have
this fraction decreased by 1/|C|, and at least (1− p)τ to have it increased by the same amount. If this
fraction is at most τ(1 + /2), we prove that it increases by  with probability o(1/Nγ), for γ being
arbitrarily large depending on the chosen value of k.
The fraction of Byzantine nodes in the cluster is dominated by the martingale with starting state
τ(1 + /2), which increases or decreases by 1/|C| with probability τ . We now show that whp, this
martingale will not exceed τ(1 + ) after O(logN) steps (recall that k logN/l ≤ |C| ≤ kl logN).
For k large enough, let T exchange stands for the number of exchanges. It is O(logN) and hence there
is a constant M such that T ≤M logN . We can derived from Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality that:
Prob(pC > τ(1 + /2)) < e−
2/4
∑Texchange
i=1 1/|C|2
≤ e−(k/l)2 log2N/4(M logN)
= e−(k/l)
2 log(N)/4M = n−γ
Similarly, if a cluster has more than a τ(1 + /2) fraction of Byzantine nodes, we have that after
O(logN) exchanges, the cluster has less than a τ(1 + /2) fraction of Byzantine nodes.
Lemma 3. Given a cluster C whose fraction of Byzantine nodes is between τ(1 + ) and τ(1 + /2) (for
some constant  > 0 independent of n), then whp, the fraction of Byzantine nodes in this cluster is less
than τ(1 + /2) after O(logN) exchanges with nodes chosen uniformly at random.
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Proof. We use the same arguments for the previous theorem. Here, the fraction of Byzantine node will
decrease of 1/|C| with probability at least τ(1 + /2) and will increase by 1/|C| with probability τ .
Therefore, as we start from a fraction of at most τ(1 + ), whp, after O(logN) exchanges, the fraction
of Byzantine nodes in this cluster is less than τ(1 + /2).
When we look at a sequence of s exchanges affecting a given cluster C, we can split this sequence
in alternating sub-sequences to apply Lemmas 2 and 3. Some sequences might lead to a fraction of
Byzantine nodes between τ(1 + /2) and τ(1 + ), while the following one will lead to a fraction of
Byzantine nodes bellow τ(1 + /2) whp. Hence, for a sequence s whose length is polynomial, by the
union bound, we obtain that is there is always (whp) more than two thirds of honest node in each
cluster for an adequate k.
Theorem 3. Whp, after a number of steps polynomial in N , at each time step, all clusters are composed
of more than two thirds of honest nodes.
Proof. Notice that to apply the previous lemmas, one has to ensure that the exchanged nodes are
replaced by nodes chosen uniformly at random. This is ensured by our join and leave operations. This
is clear for a join operation by the use of a biased CTRW to select the replacement node. For a leave
operation, this is also clear for the cluster C from which the node leaves has its nodes exchanged with
nodes selected uniformly at random. However, if we look at a cluster C ′ with which C has exchanged
nodes, then the probability that C ′ receives a Byzantine node is not necessarily τ as it is equal the
proportion of Byzantine nodes in C. This is why we enforce C ′ to exchange all its nodes.
Now, given a specific cluster, C we consider an alternating sequence of time steps t1, . . . , ti, . . . when
the fraction of nodes controlled by the adversary in C becomes larger or equal to τ(1 + /2) and when
it becomes smaller.
Consider i such that at ti the fraction of nodes controlled by the adversary in C is less than τ(1+/2)
(this is in particular true at the beginning). Then at ti+1, it becomes greater or equal to τ(1 + /2) and
is less than τ(1 + ). Lemma 3 ensures that time step ti+2 comes within O(logN) steps, and Lemma 2
ensures that between ti+1 and ti+2, the adversary never controls more than a τ(1 + ) fraction of nodes
of the cluster.
By an union bound over all clusters, we have the announced result.
Remark 2. Considering an adversary controlling at most a fraction 1/r −  of the nodes for some
constant  > 0 and r ≥ 2 independent of n, it is possible to strengthen Theorem 3 to obtain that in all
the clusters the adversary controls at most a fraction 1/r of the nodes.
5 Related Work
Several authors studied the impact of dynamics on distributed computations [10, 9] and overlay net-
works. In [12, 28, 29], the communication links of a dynamic network may be modified by the adversary
under some connectivity restrictions. In [4], the authors study the scenario in which the adversary can
force a large number of nodes of its choice to leave the network while other nodes naturally join the
network at the same time. These join and leave operations impact the topology. Yet the size of the
network is assumed to remain constant. The authors assume furthermore that the nodes are connected
via an expander graph. Depending on whether the adversary has to decide in advance the identities of
the nodes to be kicked-out of the network, the authors propose almost-everywhere agreement protocols
tolerating at each time step a churn of, respectively O(n) and O(
√
n). The two main differences with our
work are that (1) all nodes are assumed to be honest (i.e., the adversary is only external) and (2) nodes
are connected via an expander graph by assumption. In contrast, our protocol tolerates a Byzantine
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adversary controlling a constant fraction of the nodes of the network and dynamically maintains the
expander graph.
Some protocols have been proposed to maintain P2P overlay networks. Some offer efficient routing
strategies and tolerate crashes, e.g. CAN, Pastry or Tapestry [39, 40, 43]. Some are dedicated to
asynchronous networks with concurrent joins and leaves [34]. However, none guarantees both that each
node has a low degree and that the resulting overlay exhibits good expansion properties in the sense we
require here. Protocols such as SHELL [42] organize peers into a heap structure resilient to large Sybil
attacks, while the overlay presented in [30] is resilient to an adversary that can force several peers to
crash and join in a arbitrary manner. In [30], the number of join and leave operations tolerated at each
turn is proportional to the degree of the nodes, which is optimal. However, the communication cost for
maintaining the overlay is high as all the nodes of the network exchange messages at each step.
Other protocols considered unstructured overlays. The protocol of [33] builds an overlay correspond-
ing to an expander graph obtained from the union of several random cycles. This protocol has been
further extended and analyzed in [3, 21]. Maintaining unstructured overlays induces fewer message ex-
changes compared to structured overlays [30, 39, 40, 43] since only a polylogarithmic number of nodes
are involved in the communication upon a join or a leave operation. Some of the previous constructions
[3, 21] and [33] can be complemented by a recent protocol from Pandurangan and Trehan [37] which
preserves the expansion properties of a graph upon adversarial node removals. Nevertheless, the healing
procedure proposed does not ensure an absolute expansion factor as we do.
The closest to ours, from the model perspective (dynamic network), is the one developed by Awer-
buch and Scheideler [5, 7, 8, 41]. They consider a synchronous network in which an adversary can
force nodes to join and leave at each time step, with the constraint that the number of nodes in the
network is always within a constant factor of the initial size. Their protocols further require that ini-
tially the network is exclusively composed of honest nodes and that the Byzantine ones join the network
only after a particular initialization phase has taken place. Within this model, the authors propose a
technique to maintain clusters of size O(log n) composed of a majority of honest ones. Our approach
improves upon these previous works in several ways as we do not assume that initially the network is
exclusively composed of honest nodes, we describe more precisely how to distributively perform all the
operations, and, more importantly, we maintain a partition of the nodes when the size of the network
varies polynomially.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper answers positively the following question raised in [26]: “Can we [..] address problems of
robustness in networks subject to churn? An idea is to assume that: 1) the number of processors
fluctuates between n and
√
n where n is the size of name space; 2) the processors do not know explicitly
who is in the system at any time; and 3) that the number of bad processors in the system is always less
than a 1/3 fraction. In such a model, can we 1) do Byzantine agreement; and 2) maintain small (i.e.
polylogorathimic size) quorums of mostly good processors?”
Our clustering protocol can be leveraged to implement efficient and robust algorithms for various
problems such as broadcast, agreement, aggregation, and sampling in the context of highly dynamic
networks. A broadcast algorithm using our technique would have for instance O˜(n) message complexity
as compared to O(n2) without the clustering. Similarly, a sampling algorithm relying on our protocol
would have a polylog(n) message complexity per sample. (We discuss these and other applications in
the appendix).
We currently seek schemes to alleviate the need of the assumption of synchronous nodes. Another
objective is to devise a procedure for the initialization phase of NOW whose communication cost is
o(n2t0) (as opposed to O(n
3
t0) currently).
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Appendix
A Continuous Time Random Walk
We briefly review fundamental results on continuous time random walk (CTRW) [1], which we use as a
building block for both our protocols OVER and NOW.
Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), a CTRW is described by the following stochastic process: a
virtual agent walks from node to node through edges chosen uniformly at random from the ones incident
to the node on which the agent currently is. The walk is scheduled for a given amount of time T , and
when the agent visits a given node v, it decrements a counter, representing the remaining time of the
random walk, by log(1/U)/dv, where U is a number chosen uniformly at random from (0, 1). As long
as the value of the counter is positive, the agent chooses at random a new neighbor and walks to this
node. Otherwise, the walk stops. We denote by ψt(u) the probability vector of the position of the agent
at time t for u ∈ V the starting node of the CTRW.
This type of CTRW has a uniform stationary distribution pi = (1/n)i [1], and its speed of convergence
is characterized by the mixing time. More precisely, for every  > 0, the -mixing time of a CTRW
is Tmix() = maxu∈V min{t|d(ψt′(u), pi) ≤ , ∀t′ > t}, where d(., .) is a distance function such as the
maximum absolute difference of coordinates between two vectors.
The interpretation of [35] (Theorem 5.2) states that 1/ represents the expected number of samples
needed before retrieving an improperly selected node compared to the stationary distribution pi. As we
rely on random walks to generate samples, which is done a number of times polynomial in n, we use
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 = Θ(1/nc) for a chosen constant c. The choice of this value for  means that whp all our samples
can be considered as being picked uniformly at random. Tmix() can be upper bounded by using λ2
(d(ψt(u), pi) ≤
√
n
2 e
−λ2t, [17]), the second eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of G, which itself can be
lower bounded using I(G) (the isoperimetric constant of G defined as I(G) = infS:|S|≤n/2E(S, S¯)/|S|
where E(S, S¯) is the number of edges between S and S¯ = V \ S), and ∆, its maximum degree (λ2 ≥
I(G)2/2∆(G), [27]). For graphs from the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi G(n, p) model [14], for an arbitrarily small positive
constant α, p = log(n)1+α/n and d = np, whp λ2 ≥ d2/8∆(G) (Theorem 5.4 of [18]).
If the nodes of the graph are weighted by a weight function w : V → (min,max), to bias the CTRW
towards those with a bigger weight, once the CTRW is over, finishing at node v, a random value between
0 and 1 is chosen. If it is smaller than w(v)/max, v is returned, otherwise a new CTRW is started.
When min/max is constant, the expected number of computed CTRW is constant and of O(log n) whp.
The stationary distribution becomes
(
w(v)∑
w(v)
)
.
B OVER: Expander Graphs
OVER (for Over-Valued Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph) maintains an overlay modeled by a graph whose vertices
are the clusters forming the partition of the nodes of the network. The term vertex is used in the
context of the overlay and node is used in the context of the network. Since each cluster contains more
than two thirds of honest nodes whp, we can assume in this section that all the vertices of the overlay
are honest. We use the notation ĜR where the ˆ relates to the fact that we consider an overlay, and the
R that it is an instance of a random graph. The evolution of the graph is represented by a sequence
ĜRt0 , . . . , Ĝ
R
ti , . . .. nti denotes the number of vertices of Ĝ
R
ti . OVER relies mainly on four subroutines:
CTRW, Add, Remove and Link (detailed below). These are devised in a such a way that, starting from
a random graph drawn from the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, whp, at any time during a sequence of vertex
additions and removals polynomial in N , the resulting graph has a large isoperimetric constant and a
low degree (Theorems 1 and 2). Furthermore, as we will explain, this graph is robust against random
vertices removal performed without calling the subroutine Remove§ at the end of Section B.2.
B.1 OVER: basic primitives
• CTRW(v) returns a vertex chosen by a CTRW (Continuous Time Random Walk, cf. Appendix A)
from vertex v. The communication cost and round complexity of this subroutine are twice the
length of the path performed by the CTRW, which is O(log2N) as proven in the next subsection.
• Link(u, v) adds an extra edge between the vertices u and v. The communication cost and round
complexity of this subroutine are the length of the path used to communicate between u and v.
• Add(v) is executed by a vertex v contacted by a vertex u upon joining the network. 2 log1+αN
edges are added at random to connect u to the rest of the graph using Link(u, CTRW(v)). (α is
chosen positive constant that can be arbitrarily close to 0.)
• Remove(v) is executed by a vertex v leaving the network without crashing. The edges connected
to v are removed and 2 log1+αN new edges are added at random using Link(CTRW(v), CTRW(v))¶.
Note that the complexities given in this section will be increased when used in NOW (later), as each
vertex of the overlay corresponds to several nodes, and a message from a vertex C1 to another vertex
C2 induces |C1| × |C2| messages between nodes.
§When a vertex of the overlay is removed without calling Remove, this means that the number of active nodes of the
corresponding cluster C is not sufficient to send valid messages, i.e. that more than half of the nodes of C have crashed,
and hence no valid message can be send by more than half of the nodes originally in C.
¶Upon removal, adding edges is fundamental as otherwise the number of remaining edges in the graph may not be
sufficient to guarantee connectivity after a number of vertex removals that is polynomial in N .
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Algorithm 3 Continuous Time Random Walk: CTRW(v).
Require: A connected graph G = (V,E) whose Laplacian second eigenvalue is λ2 and a starting vertex v.
Ensure: The returned vertex is chosen uniformly at random.
v sets T = log2 n/λ2.
v chooses at random a neighbor u and moves to current node = u.
while T > 0 do
current node chooses at random a number U ∈ (0, 1).
current node updates T = T − log(1/U)/dcurrent.
current node chooses at random a neighbor u and moves to current node = u.
end while
Return current to the original vertex v by following in a backward manner the path constructed by the CTRW.
Algorithm 4 Adding a new edge: Link(u, v).
Require: A connected graph G = (V,E) and two vertices u and v.
Ensure: The addition of an edge between u and v.
u adds v to its list of neighbors.
v adds u to its list of neighbors.
B.2 Analysis of the OVER graph
We show here that at each time step, the graph constructed by OVER exhibits good expansion properties
and a small maximum degree. These results are proved under the assumption that the random choices
made during the construction of ĜR are perfectly uniform (i.e, the small bias induced by the random
walk is ignored). This assumption is justified by the fact that we consider a mixing time after which the
distance from the distribution of the sample to the uniform distribution is O(n−c) for some arbitrarily
large constant c.
We further demonstrate the results for a single addition or removal of vertex at once, but it can
be easily extended to a higher number of additions and removals that could be performed in parallel
(Section C.5).
Theorem 1 (Isoperimetric constant of ĜR). Whp, at any time t after a number of time steps polynomial
in n, ĜRt has an isoperimetric constant I(Ĝ
R
t ) ≥ log1+αN/2.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we demonstrate that at each time step ti, Ĝ
R
ti can be seen as an instance
of a graph from the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model G(nti , p(nti)) with p = log(N)1+α/nti to which some edges have
been added.
If p(n) is decreasing (i.e., p(n+1) < p(n)), a graph generated from the model G(n+1, p(n+1)) can be
considered as a sub-graph of a graph of G(n, p(n)) to which a new vertex v has been added and such that
each new potential edge is created with probability p(n+1). By drawing on this analogy, one can proceed
as follow: first choose a degree dv for v according to the binomial distribution Bi(n+ 1, p(n+ 1)), and
then choose dv neighbors uniformly at random. We follow this procedure when we add a new vertex to
ĜRti (join operation), with p(nti) = (log
1+αN)/nti . The added vertex has a degree equals to 2 log
1+αN ,
which whp leads to a larger degree than Bi(nti , log
1+αN/nti).
Algorithm 5 Adding a vertex: Add(v).
Require: A connected graph G = (V,E), a new vertex u that contacts a vertex v already present in the graph.
Ensure: The addition of 2 log1+α n edges at random that connect u to the rest of the graph.
for i = 0; i = i+ 1; i < 2 log1+α n do
v executes Link(u, CTRW(v)).
end for
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Algorithm 6 Removing a vertex: Remove(v).
Require: A connected graph G = (V,E) and a vertex v that has left G in a proper manner (i.e, without crashing).
Ensure: The addition of 2 log1+α n edges at random.
for i = 0; i = i+ 1; i < 2 log1+α n do
v executes Link(CTRW(v), CTRW(v)).
end for
Similarly, when p(n) = (log1+αN)/n, a graph issued from the model G(n, p(n)) can be seen as a sub-
graph of a graph of G(n, p(n+ 1)) to which less than 2 log1+αN edges have been added at random. We
follow this procedure when a vertex of ĜRti is removed (leave operation). Therefore, Ĝ
R
ti can be seen as an
instance of G(nti , p(nti)) to which some edges have been added. From [18] and as p(nti)nti >> log(nti),
we have I(ĜRti) ≥ p(nti)nti/2 = (log1+αN)/2.
To illustrate the previous lemma, consider the following case: starting from a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graph with
√
N nodes, we add nodes until we reaches N nodes. The first nodes are connected by edges,
each present with probability O(log1+αN/
√
N). When nodes are added, the probability of presence of
the new edges will decrease, and it will be of O(log1+αN/N) for the last one. Therefore, we can see
that the graph has a bigger density of edges among the initial nodes. This is why the obtained graph
is not an instance of G(N, p(N)), but rather such an instance with extra edges in between the oldest
nodes.
Theorem 2 (Maximum degree of ĜR). Whp, at any time t after a number of time steps polynomial in
n, ĜRt has maximal degree at most c log
1+αN for some sufficiently large constant c.
Proof. Given a sequence of graphs of the form ĜRti , we want to compute the sequence of degrees of a
specific vertex v. Let tjoin be the time at which v joins the network. If tjoin = t0, then v is in Ĝ
R
0 the
initial graph. Otherwise if tjoin > t0 then v belongs to Ĝ
R
tjoin but not to Ĝ
R
tjoin−1 . We now focus on a
sequence during which v does not leave the network. During this sequence, the addition and removal
of vertices have the following impact on the degree of v, for nti the number of vertices in Ĝ
R
ti before the
action performed at step ti+1 is executed:
• When a vertex is added, nti+1 = nti + 1, and the degree of v increases by one with probability
(2 log1+αN)/nti .
• When a vertex is removed, nti+1 = nti − 1, and the degree of v decreases by one with probability
dt(v)/(nti−1)‖ as the vertex removed at random may be connected to v. Afterwards, as 2 log1+αN
edges are added at random, the degree of v increases by at most a value corresponding to the
hyper-geometric distribution as 2 log1+αN trials are performed to select nti − 2 edges among(nti−1
2
)
possible edges in total.
By assumption, the number of vertices in ĜRti at a particular time step ti verifies
√
N ≤ nti ≤ N . If
we consider a sequence of addition and removal of vertices starting from nt0 =
√
N , ∗∗ then there are
at most N −√N more addition than removal operations. Moreover, each removal occurring at time tj
can be associated to an addition that has occurred at time ti < tj such that nti = ntj .
Considering the event {dt(v) ≥ c log1+αN}, we want to prove that its probability of occurrence is
very low. Such an event would be preceded by another event:
‖the vertex which is removed is chosen among (nti − 1) vertices as we work conditionally on the fact that v is not
removed.
∗∗Starting from a larger size would result only in adding less edges, therefore the degree would have less probability to
go over c log1+αN .
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{dt′(v) ≥ c2 log1+αN} such that from t′ to t the degree of v remains higher than c2 log1+αN . The
probability that such an event occurs can be upper bounded by the probability of the following random
variable being larger than c log1+αN .
For all time steps ti, we have
√
N ≤ nti ≤ N and we define X =
∑N
j=
√
N
Wi +
∑T
i=0(Xi + Yi + Zi)
in which:
• Wj = +1 with probability log1+αN/j.
• Xi = +1 with probability log1+αN/nti .
• Yi = −1 with probability c2 log1+αN/nti (as d(v) ≥ c2 log1+αN , we can lower bound the probability
that it decreases).
• Zi follows the hyper-geometric distribution corresponding to 2 log1+αN trials to select nti − 2
elements among
(nti−1
2
)
.
Using standard Chernoff bounds, we obtain that in order to reach
∑T
i=0Xi ≥ c log1+αN , T needs
to be sufficiently large with respect to N so that
∑
1/nti is large enough. From this, it is possible to
infer that the probability of the event {X > c log1+αN} is o(n−c′) small in N for an arbitrarily large c′
(depending on c). Therefore, the maximum degree of ĜRti is upper bounded whp by c log
1+αN at each
time step during a polynomial number of join and leave operations.
The fact that more than half of the nodes of a cluster simultaneously leave the network (voluntarily
or not) corresponds to a crash of the corresponding vertex in the overlay. Effectively, the cluster can
then no longer send valid messages as a message needs to be sent by at least half of the nodes of the
cluster to be valid. The graph ĜRt obtained with OVER is robust against nt random such crashes of
vertices: the properties of Theorems 1 and 2 will still be ensured whp. This resilience can be deduced
from the proof of Theorem 1 (which appears in the Appendix). (In comparison, a graph obtained using
techniques presented in [3, 21, 33] is composed of an union of cycles. Therefore if a vertex crashes, the
cycles are cut and the protocol no longer works.)
C NOW: Initialization phase
C.1 Distributed random number generation
randNum enables the nodes of a cluster to agree on a common integer chosen uniformly at random from
the interval (0, r) (the value of r is determined by the protocol using randNum. Here, r represents a
knowledge common to all the nodes involved.). In short, the idea is that each node generates a value
uniformly at random from the interval (0; r), and forwards it to the other nodes. The sum of the chosen
values modulo r gives the output. An unbiased random number can be securely computed with the
protocol of [13] when private channels are available. Alternatively, one can use the technique proposed
in [6] which does not require private channels but tolerates only a sixth of Byzantine nodes and has little
bias. The communication cost of these algorithms are polylog(N) and O(log2N) (we use O(log2N) in
the following, this allows us to keep track of the precise complexity rather than to have a polylog(N)
one, but it applies only to τ ≤ 1/6− ). The round complexity are polylog(N) and O(logN).
C.2 Random cluster choice
C.3 Exchange of nodes
The algorithm related to the exchange of nodes is described in Algorithm 9.
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Algorithm 7 Distributed random number generation: randNum.
Require: A cluster C with a majority of honest nodes and an integer r.
Ensure: The generation of an integer chosen at random from the interval (0; r).
Each node of C chooses an integer chosen uniformly at random from (0; r) and encrypts it using its session public key.
The node compute the sum modulo r of the chosen number using the protocol of [13].
Output the obtained value.
Algorithm 8 Randomly choosing a cluster: randCl.
Require: A graph connecting clusters each with a majority of honest nodes and an initial cluster C.
Ensure: The choice of a cluster uniformly at random among all the clusters.
The nodes from C choose an integer i at random using randNum with the integer r = dC and set T = 8 logn.
The nodes from the current cluster C initiate a CTRW by sending a message to all the nodes of the cluster C′ for C the
ith neighbor of cluster C on the overlay.
C′ becomes the current cluster.
while T > 0 do
The nodes from the current cluster choose a number U from (0, 1) using randNum, and reduce T by log(1/U)/d, for d
being the degree of the current cluster.
The nodes from the current cluster choose an integer i from (1, d) using randNum.
The nodes from the current cluster C send a message to all the nodes of the cluster C′, which is the ith neighbor on
the overlay of cluster C.
C′ becomes the current cluster.
end while
Output the identity of the current cluster in which the walks has ended.
C.4 Global knowledge computation
The goal of this algorithm, used during the initialization phase of NOW is to ensure that all honest nodes
of a cluster know the identities of all nodes. This algorithm terminates after a number of communication
rounds at most the diameter of the graph considering only the edges adjacent to at least one honest
node. When the algorithm terminates, it is guaranteed that all honest nodes know the identities of all
nodes in the network. Its communication cost is O(n× e) where e = |E| (see Appendix for the theorem
and details).
Theorem 3 (Global knowledge computation). In a graph composed of n vertices, Algorithm 10 ter-
minates after a number of communication rounds at most the diameter of the graph considering only
the edges adjacent to at least one honest node. When the algorithm terminates, it is guaranteed that all
honest nodes know the identities of all nodes in the network. Its communication cost is O(n× e) where
e = |E|.
Proof. Each node sends its list of original neighbors to each other node exactly once, therefore its
complexity is
∑
(n− 1)× dv = O(n× e). It further contact each node exactly one to ask for the set of
neighbors. This does not change the asymptotic complexity.
Algorithm 9 Exchange of nodes: exchange.
Require: A graph connecting clusters with a majority of honest nodes and a cluster C.
Ensure: All the nodes of C are exchanged with nodes chosen at random.
for nodes x in C do
Choose a cluster Cx using randCl.
The nodes from Cx choose an integer ix using randNum with r = |Cx|, which corresponds to a node yx of Cx.
end for
for nodes x in C do
All the nodes from Cx send a message to all the nodes of the neighboring clusters that x replaces yx.
All the nodes from C send a message to all the nodes of the neighboring clusters saying that yx replaces x.
end for
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Algorithm 10 Global knowledge computation
Require: A graph G = (V,E) in which honest nodes form a connected component and each Byzantine node is adjacent
to an honest node. A node v knows its neighbors Γv = {u : uv ∈ E}.
Ensure: All honest nodes know V .
Each node v do:
Set its request list to Γv, V
0
v = Γv and i = 1.
while v request list is not empty do
round j: v asks to all u in its request list for Γu. v set its request list to empty.
for all requests received by v do
round j + 1: v sends Γv to the node requesting it if it has not done so yet.
end for
round j + 1: V iv = V
i−1
v
for all set of neighbors Γ received by v do
round j + 1: V iv = V
i
v ∪ Γ.
end for
round j + 1: v set i = i+ 1 and its list to V iv \ V i−1v
end while
Set V to V iv .
We are especially interested in the graph G′ obtained when considering only the edges with at least
one honest node. We denote by d′(u, v) the distance between u and v in G′.
We prove the theorem by induction. The induction hypothesis is that at the end of the ith times v
went through the while loop, V iv contains at least all the nodes at distance less than i+ 1 in G
′.
Before v enters the while loop, V 0v contains all the nodes at distance 1 in G
′. During the first
execution of the while loop, v receives at least all the neighbors of its honest neighbors, therefore the
induction hypothesis is true for this first time as V 0v contains {u : d′(u, v) ≤ 2}.
Now we consider an induction step. V i−1v contains all the nodes at distance i in G′. During the
while loop, v receives the neighbors (in G) of all honest nodes in V i−1v from which it has not heard yet.
This ensures that it has received all the nodes at distance i+1 in G′, proving the induction step is valid.
The while loop terminates when the request list is empty. Such an event occurs when v has V i−1v = V iv
which means that no nodes that v contacted are nodes that were unknown to v. In other words, it
means that all the neighbors of the nodes of V i−1v are in V i−1v . But since the honest nodes form a
connected component and that all the nodes controlled by the adversary are adjacent to at least one
honest node, we conclude that V i−1v = V .
Finally, the induction hypothesis directly gives us that the algorithm stops after a number of com-
munication rounds at most the diameter of G′.
This theorem requires that each node controlled by the adversary is adjacent to at least one honest
node as otherwise, if a node x does not satisfy this hypothesis, the adversary may decides that some
honest node know about x while some others do not. This may be problematic to apply the protocol
presented in [26]. On the other end, this hypothesis can be dropped if we use protocols that do not
required each honest node to have the same view of the network.
C.5 Weakening the assumptions
We discuss here how to weaken some of the assumptions upon which NOW has been analyzed in order
to increase the generality of our construction. In particular, we describe how to adapt NOW so that it
can tolerate several parallel join and leave operations.
Occurrence of several join and leave operations at a particular time step In order to accom-
modate a high number of nodes joining and leaving at each time step, it is sufficient to consider clusters
of larger size. For instance, to be able to cope with logiN nodes joining or leaving the network at each
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Figure 3: Overview of the algorithms stack.
time step for some constant i ≥ 0, we can use clusters of size logi+1N nodes instead of logN . As a
consequence, at each time step, the number of nodes susceptible to leave a cluster is negligible compared
to its size. Hence, the adversary cannot control a majority of the nodes of a cluster by forcing all the
nodes from this cluster to leave at the same time step. All the proofs that we have developed can be
adapted to cope with this new cluster size. Moreover, with respect to the operations used by OVER and
NOW, they can all be performed in parallel and therefore no further adaptation is required. Finally,
the new construction does not impact the round complexity and increases only the communication cost
by a polylogarithmic factor.
Multiple crashes Our protocol tolerates an adversary that can make ηn random nodes crash simul-
taneously if we suppose that it controls at most a 1/3 −  fraction of the nodes and that η is small
enough when compared to . This type of crashes can be used to simulate a failure of some critical links
in a network. The assumption that the crashes are random is necessary as, otherwise, the adversary
could split the honest nodes into disconnected components and gain the lead in some clusters, which
will make NOW (and any other protocol) fail.
If we assume that the adversary controls at most a 1/6−  fraction of the nodes, then regardless of
the number of simultaneous honest nodes crashing, the adversary will not control more than a third of
the nodes in a cluster whose remaining size is greater than half of its size before the crash.
D Applications
The overlay of clusters we obtain (using NOW and OVER) can be applied to solve a wide range of
problems in distributed computing. We review some of these applications in this section. The layering
of the corresponding algorithms is depicted in Figure D. The complexities obtained by the different
applications are summarised later. Figure D describes the interactions between the different algorithms.
D.1 NOW-Broadcast
Broadcast, first introduced in [38], is one of the fundamental primitives in distributed computing. In
a nutshell, the sender, a specific node in the network, aims at sending a message to all nodes in the
network such that (a) either they all receive the same message, or (b) the broadcast is aborted and
none receive it (this could happen for instance if the sender crashes or tries to send different messages
to different nodes).
Broadcast is particularly challenging in a system in which the adversary controls some of the nodes.
Current broadcast algorithms that tolerate an adversary controlling a constant fraction of the nodes
have a communication cost that is at least quadratic in the size of the network (compared to linear when
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there is no adversary). The design of a broadcast algorithm with a lower communication cost would
increase the efficiency of any algorithm relying on a broadcast channel. However, such an algorithm
cannot be deterministic. In the following, we discuss how to use our overlay of clusters to design a
robust and efficient probabilistic broadcast algorithm.
D.1.1 Broadcasting in a network composed only of honest nodes
If there is no adversary and the network is a good expander graph, it is easy to design an efficient
broadcast algorithm: each node simply forwards the message to all its neighbors. The time complexity
equals the diameter  of the graph (defined as the maximum over the length of the shortest path between
two vertices), while the communication cost equals the number of edges. An even more efficient solution
consists in sending the message only through the edges of a precomputed tree T of depth , which leads
to a number of messages sent equals to the number of nodes (minus one). Such a tree T can be computed
via a breadth first search for instance.
Relying on the overlay of clusters built and maintained by NOW and OVER, it is possible to derive
a broadcast algorithm that can tolerate an adversary and whose communication cost is O˜(n) The
algorithm is basically the following:
• When a node u wants to broadcast a message, it first broadcasts it to all other nodes in its cluster
using a secure broadcast algorithm (e.g., [23] whose complexity is quadratic in the size of the
cluster).
• A cluster receiving the message propagates it to all its neighbors in T : each node forwards the
message to all nodes of the neighboring clusters iff the message is supported by a majority of
nodes of the original cluster.
The global communication cost of the algorithm is O(n log2+2αN) as there are n − 1 edges in T ,
each inducing an exchange of O(log2+2αN) messages.
Algorithm 11 NOW-Broadcast
Require: A network with a partition and an overlay maintained by NOW.
Ensure: The same message will be broadcast to all the nodes of the network whp.
The sender sends its message M using a secure broadcast algorithm to all nodes in its cluster.
A node that has received M (after a majority vote) during the previous time step forwards it to all
nodes of the neighboring clusters.
D.2 NOW-Agree
We now show how to leverage our clustering technique (i.e., overlay of clusters) to implement an efficient
solution to the Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem [32]. In a network composed only of honest nodes,
agreement can be easily solved by having one of the nodes in the network (e.g., the one with the smallest
identifier) send its input to all the other nodes. In the presence of an adversary controlling a fraction of
the nodes and assuming that each node has a global knowledge of the network, the algorithm proposed
by King and Say [26] solves the BA problem with a communication cost of O˜(n
√
n). In our setting,
assuming NOW and OVER, a cluster initiates a BA algorithm as follow:
• The nodes of this cluster run a BA algorithm among themselves.
• These nodes then broadcast the result of the BA to the rest of the nodes of the network by calling
the NOW-Broadcast algorithm described in the previous subsection.
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When the identity of the cluster initiating the agreement algorithm or the cluster with the smallest
identifier is not clear, we need a procedure to initiate the agreement algorithm on at least one cluster,
but not too many ones. By assumption, we know that the size of the network is between
√
N and
N . Therefore, if each node initiates the agreement algorithm with probability logN/N , and if after
log4N steps no output is received, it means that no node has initiated the algorithm. In this case,
each cluster proceeds by initiating the algorithm with a probability that is twice the previous one. One
can show that this procedure has to be repeated at most logN times in order to ensure that each
cluster receives at least one output whp. In this case, O(logN) clusters will have broadcast a message,
which results in the communication cost being increased by a factor logN as compared to the original
broadcast algorithm. In order for a node to choose among the multiple outputs it receives, a cluster
C broadcasting a message attaches to it a tag that corresponds to the lowest id within the cluster C.
Therefore, the final output selected by a node is the message received whose attached id is the lowest.
Algorithm 12 NOW-Agree
Require: A network with a partition and an overlay maintained by NOW. All nodes have an input
bit. A node u ∈ C initiates the protocol NOW-Agree.
Ensure: All honest nodes agree on a bit that was proposed initially by one of them.
Nodes in C run a BA algorithm among themselves (such as [26]) and output b.
Cluster C broadcasts b to the network by using NOW-Broadcast.
D.3 NOW-Aggregate
In [16], an algorithm has been proposed to compute aggregate functions in a secure and scalable manner
by relying on a ring overlay (i.e., an overlay in which the clusters are organized in a ring). This type of
overlay can either be maintained with ĜR or computed from scratch when needed. Alternatively, one can
construct a tree via a breadth-first search started on a chosen cluster (for instance via a BA algorithm
such as the one described in the previous subsection). This later option produces a structure of small
diameter and therefore can be used to improve the round complexity of the aggregation algorithm.
Using the algorithm of [16] leads to a communication cost of O(n log2N).
If privacy is not a primary concern, in the sense that the adversary can learn information about
the input of honest nodes, one can rely on the algorithm proposed in [36] to compute efficiently an
aggregation function. Thereafter, we describe the pseudo code of such an algorithm in the situation in
which the aggregation function considered is the sum. However, it is straightforward to adapt it to any
separable function as defined in [36]. We refer the reader to the original paper for the description of the
full algorithm and its detailed analysis.
The propagation of the minimum of each WCi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, leads to a communication cost for the
broadcast algorithm of O˜(nr).
D.4 NOW-Sample
A peer sampling service provides each node with a sample of nodes picked uniformly at random [24, 11].
We can derive a NOW-Sample algorithm as follows: first, a node calls the peer sampling service at the
level of its cluster; afterwards, its cluster initiates a biased CTRW to select a cluster. The chosen cluster
then designates a node chosen uniformly at random, whose identifier is sent back to the node requiring
the sample. This algorithm has a polylogarithmic round complexity and is repeated several times to
obtain a sample of the desired size.
23
Algorithm 13 NOW-Aggregate
Require: A network with a partition and an overlay maintained by NOW. Each node u has a positive
integer yu as input and knows a common integer r measuring the accuracy of the estimated value
obtained.
Ensure: Each node learns an estimate of the sum of all the values, i.e.
∑
v∈V yv.
For each cluster C, the nodes of C broadcast their input to all the other nodes of C.
Each node of C computes yC =
∑
v∈C yv.
Nodes of C collaboratively generate r independent random numbers WC1 , . . .W
C
r using the primitive
randNum, such that the distribution of each WCl is exponential with rate yC for l = 1, . . . , r.
Each cluster broadcasts WC1 , . . .W
C
r using NOW-Broadcast.
Each node computes W˜l = minCW
C
l for l = 1, . . . , r.
Each node u computes r∑r
l=1 W˜l
, which is output as the estimate of
∑
v∈V yv.
Algorithm 14 NOW-Sample
Require: A network with a partition and an overlay maintained by NOW, as well as two parameters
δ ∈ (0, 1) and a node u requiring a sample.
Ensure: The node u receives the id of a node chosen uniformly at random.
The node u ∈ C broadcasts a message to all the nodes of its cluster requiring a sample.
run = true
while run do
The cluster C initiates randCl, which returns C ′.
C ′ set run = false with probability |C ′|/kl log n using randNum. Otherwise set C = C ′.
end while
The cluster C ′ selects one of its nodes v at random using the primitive randNum.
The cluster C ′ sends v to u following the path used by randCl in a backward manner.
24
D.5 Summary
The complexities obtained by the different applications are summarized below.
Protocol Communication cost Round complexity
NOW-Broadcast O˜(n) O()
NOW-Agree O˜(n) O()
NOW-Aggregate O˜(nr) O()
(standard version)
NOW-Aggregate O˜(n) O˜(n)
(privacy-preserving version)
NOW-Sample (per sample) polylog(N) polylog(N)
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